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ABSTRACT 
 
Little work examines women’s representation in elected office in non-Western 
countries, especially in the Arab region. Cross-national studies considering Arabic countries 
have argued that Islam and culture are the main reasons the Arab region has the lowest rate 
of women's representation in the world. However, this topic cannot be fully understood 
without taking into account informal politics, especially tribalism and the practices of social 
elites in this region. This study investigates the determinants of voting for female candidates 
using data from the first electoral survey ever conducted in Oman, prior to the October 2015 
elections for Majlis al Shura (the elected consultative council).  It incorporates cross-
nationally recognized factors (gender ideology and religion) with a factor heretofore largely 
unexplored (tribalism).  
The analysis shows the strong effect of cultural factors in explaining women’s 
legislative representation, as suggested in previous cross-national studies. Individuals with 
high religiosity and traditional attitudes toward women are less supportive for women in the 
council. In contrast to what this researcher had expected, tribalism has no direct effect on 
self-reported likelihood of supporting women candidates. However, there is an indication of 
its importance; tribal nomination is associated with traditional gender attitudes more 
generally. The more important tribal nomination is to an individual in selecting a candidate, 
the less egalitarian attitudes toward women an individual has. Implications of these findings 
and suggestion for further research are discussed. 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Women’s underrepresentation in politics is a global phenomenon. While some countries 
such as Rwanda and Andorra have recently made significant progress in incorporating women in 
politics women are still unrepresented in most others. Understanding gender inequality in 
political representation is highly relevant because it indicates the extent to which women are able 
to influence politics more generally. This is particularly important in the context of the Arab 
region, where the rate of women's legislative representation is the lowest in the world —16% 
(IPU 2014). Focusing on Oman, an Arab Gulf state, what effect do gender ideology, Islam, and 
tribalism have on the low proportion of women in Majlis al Shura (the elected consultative 
council)?   
The theoretical and practical reasons for women’s representation in politics have 
motivated scholars to explore barriers to women’s political access mostly in the West. Little 
work, however, has been done on non-Western countries, especially in the Arab region. Cross-
national studies have considered some Arabic countries focusing on Islam and culture as the 
main reasons for the Arab region to have the lowest rate of women's representation in the world. 
However, without taking into account ‘informal rules,’ especially tribalism, and social practices 
in this region, a full understanding is missed. 
The effect of ‘informal rules’ has been emphasized in recent political science literature 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen 2015; Schatz 2004). Some Western 
studies have already shown how informal rules, like internal party politics, could limit or 
increase women’s access to politics (Kunovich and Paxton 2005). Ethnic-based patronage 
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politics play a significant role in limiting women’s opportunities in cabinet positions in Africa 
(Arriola and Johnson 2013). Case studies (Al-Zayud 2009; Sabbagh 2005) of some Arabic 
countries have reported the powerful impact of tribalism on limiting women’s access to the 
parliament. But there is no research on individual-level data testing the explanatory power of 
tribalism along with other defined factors such as gender ideology, and religion. 
This study confirms that cultural factors (gender ideology and religion) strongly affect 
Omani citizens’ levels of support for women in the legislature, and it finds indirect effect of 
tribal nomination on support for women in the legislature. It does so by using primary data from 
Oman to investigate the role of gender ideology, religiosity, and tribal affiliation in the low 
proportion of Omani women in Majlis al Shura. The suggested theoretical model is that gender 
ideology mediates the effect of religion and tribal affiliation on support of women in Majlis al 
Shura. See figure 1 below.  
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The second chapter of this paper provides an overview of women’s political participation, 
the three main explanations of women’s legislative representation, and women's legislative 
representation in the Arab region and in Oman. It also includes the proposed hypotheses. The 
third chapter traces the nature and phases of political reforms in Oman with a focus on the 
elections of Majlis al Shura. Chapter four provides details of the data and methods used for this 
study. Descriptive and multivariate analyses of the data are provided in chapter five, with a 
highlight of the main findings. The last chapter (Chapter 6) provides conclusions, implications, 
and contributions of this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Women are underrepresented in politics worldwide, although they have the right to 
participate in politics in almost every country in the world. Though they compose half of the 
population of every country (Paxton and Hughes 2007), the world average of women in 
parliament (both lower and upper houses) is 21.8% and 17.2% in ministerial positions.  In the 
highest positions of state, women are 5.9% of heads of states, 7.8% of heads of government, 
14.8% of speakers of parliament, and 26.5% of deputy speakers of parliament. Women make up 
50% or more of the parliament (lower houses) in two countries only—Rwanda and Andorra, 63.8 
and 50%, respectively (IPU 2014). 
Historically, New Zealand was the first country to open the door for women's 
participation in conventional politics. It granted women the right to vote in 1893 (Paxton, 
Hughes, and Painter 2010). Australian women were the second to be enfranchised in 1902. In the 
United States, it took three generations (1840-1920) to enfranchise women (Ford 2010). By 
1946, women had the right to vote in about 46% of the countries worldwide. In Finland during 
1907, women were elected to office for the first time in history.       
Today, the growth pattern of women's political representation differs significantly across 
regions and countries. For instance, the Nordic countries hold the highest rate of women in 
parliament (lower houses) at 42.1%, the Americas 25.2%, and Asia 18.9% (IPU 2014). In some 
countries, women's rate political representation is less than 5%, such as Kuwait and Haiti; 
whereas, other countries, like Cuba and Sweden, the rate exceeds 44%. However, there are still 
some countries, Micronesia and Qatar, that have no woman representative in their parliaments.  
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According to Paxton and Hughes (2007, 8), there are two types of arguments for the 
importance of women's presence in politics: (1) justice and (2) utility. Justice arguments are 
based on the fact women compose half of the population of every country in the world. 
Therefore, they should have equal chances of being ‘formally’, ‘descriptively’, and 
‘substantively’ represented in politics. Equal formal representation simply means de jure equality 
when participating in politics, and granting equal opportunities for both men and women in law 
without any kind of discrimination; whereas, descriptive representation demands equality for 
women, based on their percentage in the population (50%). Substantive representation 
emphasizes the importance of the willingness of elected women to ‘act for women’ by initiating, 
supporting, and presenting their interests. 
The second type of argument for women's representation highlights the practical 
consequences of including women in politics. Paxton and Hughes (2007) argue women's political 
presence improves the quality of decision-making because of a greater variety of skills and 
talents—more inputs of new ideas, values, and styles. Furthermore, others believe having women 
in politics helps motivate other women; they act as role models (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006). 
Explaining Women’s Legislative Representation 
 
 Cross-national studies on women's political representation have focused on comparing 
women's proportions in national legislatures and identifying the factors that have an impact on 
this issue. Scholars have classified these factors as social/structural, political/institutional, and 
cultural (Norris and Inglehart 2001; Paxton and Hughes 2007; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). 
According to Randall (1987) and Norris (1997), these are divided into two types of factors—
supply and demand. On one hand, supply factors (structural and cultural) prepare women to 
contest in elections, and influence their decisions to run for office by supplying them with the 
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necessary experiences, skills, and psychological dispositions. On the other hand, demand factors 
(institutional) are the nature of political systems, electoral rules, political parties, and electorates 
that increase the likelihood of electing women to political offices. Next, social/structural, 
political/institutional, and cultural will be discussed in more detail. 
Social/structural factors 
 
Structural factors focus on the social, economic, educational, and working status of 
women (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Norris 1985; Paxton 1997). Paxton and Kunovich (2003) 
anticipate women's rates of political representation are positively associated with women's 
educational achievements and workforce involvement. This means women in developing 
countries with a low level of socioeconomic status have lower proportions in politics; whereas, 
countries with higher levels of socioeconomic development have a greater proportion of women 
elected to political offices. However, some authors (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Moore and 
Shackman 1996; Paxton 1997) have found no effect of women’s educational accomplishments 
on women's presence in politics. Additionally, women's working status (particularly in 
managerial or decision-making positions) has proven to have a strong impact in some studies 
(Kenworthy and Malami 1999) and no effects in others (Paxton 1997). 
Furthermore, according to Norris and Inglehart (2001), structural factors have failed to 
explain why countries with similar social systems have different proportions of women in the 
legislature. As illustrated, Canada and the United States have similar levels of socioeconomic 
development, but different proportions of women in government offices (lower houses), 25.1 and 
18.3%, respectively (IPU 2014). The same comparison can be made between Netherlands 
(38.7%) and Italy (31.4%); and between South Africa (44.8%) and Niger (13.3%). In addition, 
Norris and Inglehart reinforce their argument by showing how some poor countries 
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(Mozambique, South Africa, and Venezuela) have higher proportions of women in politics than 
the richest countries (the U.S., France, and Japan). 
Political/institutional factors 
 
Political/institutional factors are another explanation for whether women participate in 
politics (Norris and Inglehart 2001; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). They emphasize the role of 
political systems, such as electoral rules and level of democracy, in empowering women 
politically. Cross-national studies have found electoral rules, especially proportional 
representation systems (PR), are positively related to women's proportions in parliaments 
(Lovenduski and Hills 1981; Norris 1985; Rule 1987). Proportional representation systems that 
use party lists are widely considered the most influential factor for women's presence. Parties 
publish a list of candidates so they are usually pushed to place some female candidates for equal 
opportunity between genders. Actually, some scholars have recommended effective reforms in 
electoral rules, especially adaption of a proportional representation system that would increase 
women's opportunities in politics (Norris 2004). 
The degree to which a country is democratic is another institutional factor that has been 
examined in regards to gender representation (Norris and Inglehart 2001). However, the findings 
of its impact are mixed. Some scholars (Paxton 1997) found a positive relationship between 
democracy and women's representation in politics, and others (Reynolds 1999) found no 
relationship between these two factors. Although institutional factors are better supported by 
empirical evidence than structural factors (Paxton and Kunovich 2003), they have failed to 
explain the differences in women's proportions across countries with fairly similar political 
systems (Norris and Inglehart 2001).  
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Cultural Factors  
 
This explanation focuses on gender ideology as an important factor in limiting or 
enhancing women's political presence (Norris and Inglehart 2001; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). 
Attitudes regarding women's roles differ across cultures. Some maintain traditional attitudes that 
women's roles are within the home and family, while others support equality between women 
and men. These attitudes can be considered an influence on women's participation regardless of 
social and political systems. According to Norris and Inglehart  (2001), gender ideology provides 
a reasonable explanation for the differences in women's representation between the Nordic 
region and other European countries (Switzerland, Italy, or Belgium) with relatively similar 
social and political systems. Additionally, this factor is considered a significant barrier to 
women's presence in many Islamic countries. However, there is insufficient cross-national 
empirical evidence of its impact. This is due to the lack of worldwide data on gender ideologies, 
forcing previous studies to substitute ideology with religion or region as noted by Paxton and 
Kunovich (2003), and Norris and Inglehart (2001). 
Religion/region-based studies, such as Kenworthy and Malami (1999) and Paxton (1997) 
have provided interesting information. They noted women's presence is high in Scandinavian 
countries and low in Asia and the Middle East. Countries largely Muslim and Catholic have 
lower rates of women's representation than countries largely Protestant countries. Usually, 
Christian countries have higher proportions of women in politics than countries of other religions 
(Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, Confucianism, and Hinduism). However, Norris and Inglehart 
(2001) argue religion/region explanations mirror attitudes or beliefs of a nation. These 
explanations do not capture significant differences within regions and religions. 
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According to Paxton and Kunovich (2003), some scholars have attempted to find more 
‘precise’ measurements for ideology and avoid the use of alternatives (religion and region). 
Some of these measurements examined ratifications of the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and legalizing women's 
movements and abortion. However, the effect of CEDAW is arguable as some scholars 
(Kenworthy and Malami 1999) found a positive effect and others (Paxton 1997) found no effect. 
As well, these measures do not reflect attitudes about women because they are “highly political 
decisions” (Paxton and Kunovich 2003, 92). 
In an attempt to empirically demonstrate gender ideology has an important effect on 
women's representation, Norris and Inglehart (2001) use the index of political egalitarianism to 
measure ideology in many countries. They found women's proportions in the legislature are 
higher in countries with more politically egalitarian attitudes. Furthermore, Paxton and Kunovich 
(2003) introduce a ‘national’ measurement for ideology by using data from the World Values 
Survey to collect individuals' attitudes toward gender in 46 countries (Europe, North America, 
Eastern Europe, South America, Asia, and Africa). They combine responses to questions about 
women's roles in three areas: (1) politics, (2) education, and (3) participation in the labor force. 
They also utilize information from interviews conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU).  
By applying these new measures in their analysis, they determined gender ideology has a 
stronger impact on women's presence in lower houses than structural and institutional factors. 
Women's Legislative Representation in the Arab Region 
 
The Arab region has the lowest rate of women in parliament (both lower and upper 
houses) in the world—16% (IPU 2014). Emphasizing woman's conditions differ across Arab 
countries, some scholars have attempted to identify factors that impede women's political 
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presence in this region. In a case study of three Arab countries (Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen), 
Sabbagh (2005) identifies some common factors across these countries, such as illiteracy, 
tribalism, lack of women's membership in political parties, and electoral systems. Some general 
themes in the Arab region, like patriarchy, religion (Islam), traditional gender ideology, and the 
perception that women’s empowerment is part of a ‘Western agenda’, play an essential role in 
inhibiting women's advancement, in general (AbuKhalil 1993; Sabbagh 2005) 
Among these common factors/themes, Western observers often argue Islam is the main 
impediment to women's political representation in this region. According to AbuKhalil (1993), 
the Arab ideology toward women is believed to be influenced by Islam without clear 
interpretation of the relationship between Islam and culture. He addresses this argument by 
assuring gender ideology is a worldwide issue across different religions. For example, AbuKhalil 
points to the protest that took place in Israel in 1992 for appointing a woman Minister of 
Education. Some scholars compared the status of women in pre-Islamic Arabian societies with 
that of Islamic tradition to show how Islam actually improved women’s status in different 
aspects—marriage, divorce, and inheritance (Esposito 1975). Moreover, a significant difference 
was found between Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries in attitudes toward democracy and 
gender equality (Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007). In general, women’s rights and 
democracy are more supported in Non-Arab Muslim countries than in Arab Muslim countries. 
Sabbagh (2005) also argues women's political presence in non-Arab Islamic countries 
(Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan), and the support of women by some Islamist political 
parties to compete for office are sufficient evidence to refute the Western view of Islam. 
Apparently, Islam by itself is not the cause of the low presence of women in politics in the Arab 
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region. In fact, Iranian female activists utilized Islamic sources to gain their rights and social 
positions (Hashim 1999). 
In line with these arguments, Ross (2008) refutes the role of Islam in the low proportion 
of women in politics in the Middle Eastern region. Instead, he argues oil is the main reason for 
this phenomenon. By analyzing oil production and employment data for all countries from 1960-
2002, and data on female political presentation for 2002, Ross found oil production has a 
negative impact on female employment and political representation. According to him, a rise in 
oil production causes lower female participation in the work force in two ways: (1) by having 
lower female wages because of a drop in ‘traded sectors’ (agriculture and manufacturing) and (2) 
by having higher unearned female income because of high male wages and government transfers 
generated by the rise in ‘non-traded sectors’ (construction and services). In turn, lower female 
labor force participation leads to lower female political representation because women are 
disadvantaged in participating in outside home activities (collective actions, political 
conversations, and gender discrimination experiences), which are important to enhance their 
skills and encourage them to participate in the political arena. Consequently, this pattern in oil-
producing countries leads to “strong patriarchal norms and political institutions” (Ross 
2008,107). 
Furthermore, Coffé and Dilli (2015), in their study of the gender gap in political 
participation in 13 Muslim-majority countries, found at the individual level men are more 
politically active than women in these countries. However, in examining cross-national 
differences in the gender gap, they found Islam, levels of modernization, and gender equality 
have no effect on the gender gap. 
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Although scholars believe the factors are "complex and intertwined" in this region 
(Sabbagh 2005, 64), there is no empirical research across the Middle East distinguishing among 
the impacts of these factors, especially gender ideology, which was empirically demonstrated as 
an important factor in cross-national studies (Norris and Inglehart 2001; Paxton and Kunovich 
2003). Recently, Bush and Jamal (2015) examined if either Americans or religious supporters of 
Jordan’s gender quota in parliament influence public attitudes toward women’s representation in 
politics in Jordan. Interestingly, Bush and Jamal found neither of the two endorsements 
(American and religious) have an impact on supporting women’s representation in politics. This 
finding challenges the assumption held by some scholars about the role of Arab sentiment that 
women’s empowerment is part of a ‘Western agenda’ to restrain women’s political 
representation. 
Furthermore, in general, there is a lack of research on attitudinal behaviors of voters in 
this region that could contribute to explain women's obstacles. Most of the literature on elections 
and electoral outcomes in this region focuses on reasons authoritarian regimes implement 
democratic elections (Al Haj 1996; Ehteshami and Steven 2007; Rabi 2002). Recent research by 
Miguel, Jamal, and Tessler (2015) examines determinants of turnout in this region. By using data 
from surveys conducted in seven Arab countries between 2006 and 2009, Miguel et al. found 
people vote for the purpose of supporting their regimes, especially their economic performance, 
not only because of patronage, which had been thought to be the main reason for turnout in the 
Middle East.  
In accordance, another recent study found patronage is not the main preference of voters 
for the National Federal Council in the United Arab Emirates (Yaghi and Antwi-Boateng 2015). 
Instead, candidates’ personal characteristics (age, gender, education level, political experience, 
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oratorical skills) and the quality of their campaigns motivate Emiratis to vote. In terms of gender, 
the study concluded most Emiratis voters prefer male candidates.  
Women's Legislative Representation in Oman 
 
Taking into consideration the complexity of the issue of women's political representation 
in the Arab region, the proportion of women in Majlis al Shura (the elected consultative council) 
in Oman is not surprisingly low (1.2%) relative to the overall pattern in the Arab region (IPU 
2014). In fact, the highest proportion of women in any term of Majlis al Shura was 2.4% in 2000 
and 2003 (IPU 2004).  
Women's underrepresentation in Majlis al Shura in Oman has not been examined in depth 
to date. To this researcher’s knowledge, no empirical studies exist that examine what impedes 
Omani women from making their way to the council. Previous studies (Al-Lamky 2007; Al-
Hashmi, Al-Msalami and Hassan 2009; Al-Zedjali 2009; Varghese 2011) slightly touched this 
issue within the analysis of women's empowerment in Oman, in general. Moreover, as women's 
conditions are not homogeneous across the Arab region, it is not proper to generalize the 
obstacles in other Arab states to Oman.    
Al-Lamky (2007), in her study of the perspectives of Omani female leaders, found Omani 
women in leadership positions are “highly motivated” (58). However, they are faced with the 
challenge of balancing between their positions and family/social responsibilities. Varghese 
(2011) measured economic, household, and social aspects of empowerment of 150 Omani 
women in the Sohar region. He found an Omani woman is empowered. However, “… still her 
interest towards domesticity affects her empowerment” (47). Varghese also found Omani women are 
aware of their legal/political rights and the factors positively associated to their empowerment. 
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Research by Al-Hashmi, Al-Msalami, and Hassan (2009) studied challenges of Omani 
women's participation in the public sphere, in general. Al-Hashmi et al. found (1) positive 
attitudes among men and women toward women's participation, with some reservations about 
political participation, especially among male participants; (2) Omani women are highly aware 
of women's issues in the country and the importance of their participation; and (3) culture was 
strongly considered by men and women to be the main obstacle for women's participation. 
In an attempt to identify the challenges of women's empowerment in Oman, Al-Zedjali 
(2009) completed a survey in the capital city (Muscat) on a sample of 120 females in decision-
making positions, such as minister, undersecretary of ministry, member of the state council, 
director general, and expert. The main findings of Al-Zedjali’s research include: (1) Omani 
women are empowered by the government, but they seek more opportunities, especially in 
politics and law fields; (2) culture is the main obstacle for women to work, since some segments 
of the population still hold traditional attitudes toward women; (3) 84% of the sample cited they 
are supported and inspired by their parents and husbands throughout their careers; (4) 54% of the 
sample are married and have children, which indicates women can balance family and 
professional success; and (5) 55% of the sample believe education is the most powerful tool to 
achieve socioeconomic and political changes.  
Most of these studies report culture as the main obstacle for Omani women to participate 
in the public sphere, in general. Religion seems not an obstacle for Omani women’s 
advancement. Although culture and religion are highly correlated, and religion has been used as 
a proxy for gender ideology, gender ideology was more considered (38% strongly agreed) as an 
obstacle to women's empowerment than religion (26% strongly agreed) (Al-Hashmi et al. 2009). 
Based on these findings, and previous cross-national studies on the importance of the 
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explanatory power of gender ideology on women’s political representation, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H1:  The more egalitarian attitudes towards women, the greater the support for women’s 
membership in Majlis al Shura. 
 
Regardless of the counterarguments about religion and the findings from Omani research, 
individuals with greater religiosity are less likely to support women’s representation in the 
council, since Islam is associated with low rates of women in parliaments as noted by Kenworthy 
and Malami (1999), and Paxton (1997). Furthermore, usually religious Omani men have 
reservations about women's involvement in the public sphere, in general. Even if they allow their 
wives, sisters, or daughters to work, these women would be involved in women-dominated jobs 
like school teachers and nurses. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2: The greater the religiosity, the lower egalitarian attitudes towards women.  
However, when it comes to politics, informal rules also need to be taken account, 
especially tribalism. As mentioned earlier, tribalism plays a big role in elections in some Arabic 
countries, such as Jordan and Yemen (Al-Zayud 2009; Sabbagh 2005). According to Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004), informal institutions or informal rules, like clan-based norms and clientelism, 
are those rules “created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” 
(725) and “..their origins are often unclear” (731). Basically, these are rules formed and 
expressed by social groups instead of the state. Helmke and Levitsky argue disregarding these 
rules in the political science field leads to an incomplete understanding of political behaviors. 
They are very important to create incentives that facilitate and limit political behaviors, explain 
institutional outcomes, and mediate the effect of electoral rules. Helmke and Levitsky explain 
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how the president of Mexico used to choose his successor, based on informal rules; no formal 
constitutional or electoral rules were followed.  
By explaining how clan networks are present in modern Kazakhstan and how they play a 
big role in economic and political arenas, Schatz (2004) in his book,  Modern Clan Politics: The 
Power of "Blood” in Kazakhstan and Beyond , refutes the assumption modernity eliminates clans 
from political life. He emphasizes the importance of studying clans in the field of political 
science to fully understand political phenomena in the current world. Schatz states, “By leaving 
explicit conceptualization of these identities to other disciplines, political science may misread 
their literatures and misunderstand the role these group solidarities play in the contemporary 
world” (4). In accordance with Schatz’s view, a recent study (Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen 2015) 
found clan-based governance is a strong predictor of state instability and violence; non-clan-
based societies are more stable than clan-based societies. 
Informal institutions are also important to explain economic behaviors. Xu and Yao 
(2015) found lineage networks have strong effects on public goods expenditures in rural China. 
Their study indicated from 1986 to 2005, village public investments of 220 Chinese villages 
increased significantly when the village leaders were from the largest family clans in a village.   
In the case of women’s political representation, some Western studies have already 
shown how informal rules, like internal party politics, could limit or increase women’s access to 
politics (Kunovich and Paxton 2005). In Africa, ethnic-based patronage politics limit women’s 
opportunities in cabinet positions (Arriola and Johnson 2013). Some case studies in the Arab 
region have identified tribalism as an obstacle to women’s presence in parliament.  However, 
cross-national studies on women’s legislative representation do not consider these informal 
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institutions, which vary across regions and countries. This leads to a misunderstanding of the 
actual factors that inhibit women’s access to parliament in a particular region or country.  
Tribalism 
In general, Arab culture and identity are based on tribalism where individuals have a 
strong feeling of loyalty to their tribes. The terms ‘tribes’, ‘clans’, and ‘lineage groups’ are used 
interchangeably in different contexts. However, the term ‘tribe’ will be used in this study per 
Torstrick and Faier’s (2009) use of the term, because it deals with the Arab culture, specifically 
the Arabian Peninsula. According to Torstrick and Faier, tribes consist of clans and each clan 
consists of different families. Using the family name, one can determine which clan or tribe 
someone belongs. Tribes always express the male line of descent. A married woman keeps her 
family name (that is, her father’s tribal name), but her children belong to her husband’s family. 
Arranged marriage within the same tribe is favorable in the Arabic culture because it stresses 
cooperation and keeps wealth within the same tribe (Torstrick and Faier 2009). 
Throughout history, a male tribal leader, sheikh, managed the social, economic, and 
political issues of his tribe in a sovereign territory. Succession of the sheikh was through 
bloodline, passing from father to eldest son, with some exceptions (Torstrick and Faier 2009). 
Tribes operated in a “decentralized” form (Salzman 2008). Members within a tribe had the 
responsibility of protecting each other from outsiders, and increasing the number of children for 
the purpose of strengthening the tribe’s defense and economic conditions, based on nomadic 
pastoralism. Tribal wars over territories to extend geographic space and access to economic 
resources were common. Oftentimes, the losing tribes were forced to leave their territories, but in 
some cases they were allowed to stay and become dependent upon the winning tribe. 
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In the Arabian Peninsula when oil exploration began in the 1930s, tribes were repressed 
because they were considered obstacles to modernity by ‘oil imperialists’ and by local ruling 
families (Cooke 2014; Torstrick and Faier 2009). The oil revolution in the region brought many 
changes to the tribal system. Instead of a free nomadic system, borders were defined between the 
countries to facilitate access for foreign oil companies and form citizenships. Some tribes refused 
to register as citizens because they did not want to change their way of living, particularly in the 
UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Now, they are known as Bedoons and have no civil rights in 
these states (Cooke 2014). 
However, national identities did not eliminate or replace tribalism in this region. 
Tribalism still exists and is an important element in the Gulf societies. In Tribal Modern, Cooke 
(2014) uses the Qur’an word ‘barzakh’, which means ‘undiluted convergence’ to describe how  
tribal and modern ‘mix and separate’ in these societies. Cooke states “the tribal is the new 
aristocratic in the flattening anonymity of twenty-first century transnational movement and 
cosmopolitanism” (172). Younger generations acknowledge the importance of tribalism in 
everyday activities, and feel pride and honor in their tribal identities. Marriage within the same 
tribe is still preferable (Torstrick and Faier 2009) and ‘tribal compatibility’ is more important 
than money in marriage decisions (Cook 2014). This also plays a role in politics, especially in 
parliamentary elections, like in Oman (Al-Farsi 2013; Barber 2007). 
In the Omani context, tribes before 1970 were the “main source of identity, support, and 
protection for the individual,” (Barber 2007,1) and had priority in determining people's loyalties 
(Al-Farsi 2013). Politically, the tribe played a big role in formatting the current state, 
transforming Oman from an Imamate state to a sultanistic state (Al-Farsi 2013; Al- Zayud and 
Al-Trawna 2012). Oman consists of two main Arab tribal blocks—Qahtani and Adnani—who 
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migrated to Oman after the collapse of the Ma'rab dam in Yemen during second century B.C. 
During this time, the Persians occupied Oman and the Qahtani tribes under the leadership of 
Malik bin Fahm overthrew the Persians and ruled the country. Since then, the Omani political 
system has remained dynastic until the first establishment of Islamic Imamate in Oman in 750 
A.D. with the end of the Umayyad Dynasty (Al-Farsi 2013; Al-Zayud and Al-Trawna 2012).   
Throughout Omani political history, all ruling systems were under the Qahtani block 
whereas, the Islamic Council of Elite was in the hands of the Adnani block. However, these two 
tribal blocks became involved in two major fights over political power—considered critical in 
Omani political history (Al-Farsi 2013). The first conflict occurred in 892 A.D., known as the 
Yemeni/Nizari War.  Yemeni Imam Al-Salt bin Malik, who belonged to the Qahtani block, was 
overthrown by his Supreme Judge—Nizari. Nizari belonged to the Adnani block. The 
consequences of this conflict resulted later in Abbasids' occupation of Oman. The second 
conflict, the Hinawi/Ghafri War, occurred near the end of the Ya'ariba state in 1749. An Adnani 
Sheikh from Al Ghafri tribe declared himself the Imam after a fight among members of the 
Qahtani ruling family over the Imamate. The Adnani Sheikh fought with a Qahtani Sheikh from 
the Al Hinawi tribe. The conflict between these two tribes led the Persians to invade Oman. 
As the case in most tribes in the Middle Eastern region, wars over territories were very 
common within the tribal Omani system. Major tribes owned specific areas of the country to 
become their ‘sovereign’ territories. Each tribe attempted to extend its territory to gain more 
geographic, economic, and political power at the cost of others (Al-Farsi, 2013). In this context, 
Al-Farsi expresses, “ ...tribalism does not depend on blood ties only but also on tribal alliances 
(Shaff) and political coalitions” (86). Today, tribal leaders are formally registered with the 
Ministry of Interior. They usually reside in provinces, their tribes’ sovereign territories. Omanis 
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identify each other by their tribal names, and can easily distinguish their origins and provinces 
from tribal names. 
When Sultan Qaboos came to power in 1970, he attempted to create a national identity 
for Omanis instead of tribal identity through national development plans (Chatty 1996). He 
initiated a containment policy, which incorporated master tribal leaders and opposition leaders in 
transforming Oman into a modern state (Al-Farsi 2013). These attempts are intended to loosen 
tribes' control over territories and people's loyalties. However, some research suggests tribal 
identities/values still remain unchanged in some aspects (Al-Farsi 2013; Barber 2007; Wikan 
1982). 
Wikan (1982), in her book Behind the Veil in Arabia: Women in Oman, found tribal 
values continued to play a big role in the issue of marriage in the Sohar region during the mid-
1970s. Barber (2007) examined the strength of tribal ties among rural and urban Zanzibaris in 
Oman. She found tribalism is still ‘strong’ in Oman, and individuals still value their tribe's role. 
Barber determined the tribe plays a consultative role in marriage and inheritance, but tribal 
affiliation is not used for job seeking. Most importantly, she found tribal affiliation plays a major 
role in voting for Majlis al Shura, and anticipated it would weaken in the future with more 
education and uncontrolled electoral campaigns.  Interestingly, Barber found age and level of 
education have an effect on the strength of tribal ties, not urbanization as she hypothesized. 
Barber concluded the younger, more educated the person, the weaker the tribal ties. 
Politically, Al-Farsi (2013), in his book Democracy and Youth in the Middle East: Islam, 
Tribalism, and the Rentier State in Oman, points to the ‘implicit allegiances’ to Qahtani/Adnani 
tribal blocks and the competition between these two blocks to maintain social status and political 
power. In turn, these affect Majlis al Shura elections. All three segments of the Omani population 
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that Al Farsi interviewed (government officials, religious institution members, and younger 
generations) agreed upon the positive role of a tribal culture as a social fabric, and a source of 
pride and honor for individuals. But, these groups also acknowledged the negative effects it has 
on the elections of Majlis al Shura. According to Al-Farsi’s respondents, tribes play a clear role 
in nominating candidates to ensure support regardless of their competence. Thus, this leads 
educated people to be reluctant to participate in voting and running for office. The respondents 
also mentioned agreements are formed between some tribes in certain regions to ‘circulate’ 
Majlis al Shura membership between their representatives. On the other hand, some respondents 
believed tribes have a positive role in raising voter turnout by encouraging their people to vote 
for their candidates.    
In a recent study about the relationship between clan governance and state stability 
(Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen 2015), Oman is characterized as a moderate clan-based society. It 
scores six out of eleven in the Clan Governance Index constructed by measuring eight types of 
female subordination types in marriage: (1) patrilocality, (2) inequality family law, (3) polygyny, 
(4) early marriage for women, (5) cousin marriage, (6) honor-based violence against women, (7) 
violence against women, and (8) women’s property rights.  
 In terms of women's representation in Majlis al Shura, tribes play a similar role to that 
for political parties in western democracies in limiting women's access to parliament. Political 
parties are ‘gatekeepers’ for women's political power.  Kunovich and Paxton (2005) argue 
political parties limit choices available for voters through candidate selection and supporting 
processes. They found women's presence in political parties increases the likelihood of women’s 
candidacy and election to the office in different ways, depending on the electoral system. For 
example, in proportional representation systems female party leaders can increase the number of 
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female candidates and increase the number of elected female candidates in plurality-majority 
systems (Kunovich and Paxton).  
In Oman, where political parties do not exist, tribes are the ‘gatekeepers’ for women's 
access to al Shura. Since tribes are based on patriarchal structures and play a clear role in 
nominating candidates, women are not considered in the selection process or in the supporting 
process during elections. Historically, Omani women were active in society through teaching 
illiterate women the Holy Qur'an and religious duties, and through discussing tribal/political 
issues with men (Andriyanova 2011). But, they were absent in the formal political system, 
specifically as tribal leaders or judges (Peterson 1989). Still today, women do not hold these two 
positions in Oman. Women are not involved formally in discussing tribal issues with tribal 
leaders. Therefore, within the tribal system there is no possibility for Omani women to play any 
role to support women candidates or elect them. Actually, women are influenced indirectly by 
their fathers, brothers, and husbands to vote for male tribal candidates, limiting their ability to 
support women. Moreover, in a patriarchal society, no tribe would take the lead of nominating a 
female candidate for fear of stigma.   
Alliances among some tribes within a tribal block, Qahtani or Adnani, to secure seats for 
them in Majlis al Shura also limits women's opportunities. Membership circulation and ensuring 
the vote for a certain tribal candidate eliminate women and male candidates without support. 
These alliances are encouraged by the current electoral system in which the number of 
representatives is very limited; provinces with a population of 30,000 and above have a ‘single 
non-transferrable vote’ system with a district magnitude of two (that is, two candidates per 
district), and those provinces with less than 30,000 have a ‘first past the post’ system (Majlis al 
Shura 2008). This suggests women's opportunities to access Majlis al Shura might increase if the 
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number of seats per province increases. Still, this might not be the case because individual tribes 
may fight to gain more seats. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
           H3:  The greater the strength of tribal affiliation, the less egalitarian attitudes towards 
women. 
 
Religion might limit women's access to Majlis al Shura, but religious leaders do not play 
the gatekeeper role that tribal leaders play. They do not collectively nominate candidates or 
support certain candidates at the expense of others. The influence of religion might rather be 
more apparent on the individual level. Usually, individuals with high religiosity do not support 
women's participation in fields dominated by men. So, religious men definitely do not allow their 
wives, daughters, and sisters to compete for office. In any case, they would not vote for a female 
candidate.  In addition, women with high religiosity will not compete for office or support a 
woman candidate.  
Tribalism may affect the impact of structural factors (education, income, social class, 
employment, etc.) on women's representation in Majlis al Shura. Cross-national findings are 
inconsistent on the impact of these factors on women’s legislative representation. However, in a 
tribal society, the level of education and economic status may have no or little effect on 
supporting women’s representation in Majlis al Shura. Individuals, regardless of their 
socioeconomic status, still value tribal identity over their own identities. So, they are more likely 
to vote for a male tribal candidate than for a woman. Therefore, the following three hypotheses 
are proposed:           
           H4.  There is no relationship between level of education and support for women’s 
           membership in Majlis al Shura. 
 
          H5. There is no relationship between income and support for women’s membership in 
         Majlis al Shura.  
 
  
24 
          H6.  There is no relationship between employment status and support for women’s  
          membership in Majlis al Shura. 
 
This study will also investigate the impact of demographic factors (sex, age, marital 
status, place of residency, etc.) within a tribal society on attitudes towards women’s political 
participation. Marital status and children do not appear to have an impact on Omanis' attitudes 
towards women. Al-Zedjali (2009), in her study on challenges to women's empowerment in 
Oman, found the majority (84%) of females in decision-making positions were supported and 
inspired by their parents/husbands throughout their careers. Most were married and had children. 
This indicates marital status and children have no effect on gender ideology and, consequently, 
no relationship with support for women’s representation in the council, which leads to the 
following two proposed hypotheses: 
H7.  There is no relationship between marital status and support for women’s 
               membership in Majlis al Shura. 
 
H8.  There is no relationship between having children and support for women’s 
membership in Majlis al Shura. 
 
Omani men still have some reservations about women’s political participation. Omani 
women are aware they are underrepresented in politics and law (Al-Hashmi et al. 2009). 
However, Varghese (2011) found Omani women in the Sohar region still prefer domesticity.  
This means they might not choose to compete for office and might not support women 
candidates. These findings contradict the argument there is a positive relationship between public 
knowledge of women's descriptive underrepresentation and support for women in office 
(Sanbonmatsu 2003). Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:   
              H9.  There is no relationship between sex and support for women’s membership in 
              Majlis al Shura. 
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Barber (2007) concluded urbanization has little or no effect on the strength of tribal ties 
in Oman. However, perhaps the place of permanent residency has an impact on support for 
women’s representation in the council. This argument is based on the fact all women who made 
their way into Majlis al Shura were from the capital—Muscat. Tribal ties are weaker in Muscat 
because of mixed communities, which allow people to form new affiliations other than tribal. 
Moreover, cultural constraints are usually weaker in cities than in rural regions. This assessment 
leads to the following hypothesis:  
H10.  Individuals who live in the capital are more likely than others to support 
           women’s membership in Majlis al Shura. 
 
Oman consists of different ethnic and linguistic minority groups, such as Zanzibari, 
Baluchi, and Lawati (Peterson 2004).  Zanibaris or Swahili speakers are Omanis (Arabs who 
belong to either Qahtani or Adnani tribes) who lived in Zanzibar and other parts of Africa during 
the Omani domination of the African coast or travelled back and forth for trade/employment 
purposes when the economic conditions of Oman were poor.  Therefore, Zanzibaris hold the 
same tribes as those of Omanis who only speak Arabic and did not reside along the African 
coast. On the other hand, Baluchi and Lawati tribes are not Arab tribes. Baluchi are originally 
from Baluchistan and most are Sunni. Some moved to Oman for work and settlement during 
Omani control over the Gwadar Port until 1954. Lawati are of Indian origin and they are Shi'a. 
They traditionally lived in Matrah (Sur Al Lawatia), where they still have their mosque and 
celebrate their social and religious events. 
According to Peterson (2004), the ‘assimilation process’ since 1970 has successfully 
reduced distinctions among these groups through property ownership, education systems, and 
political appointments, but discrimination still exists in Omani society, especially in marriage 
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and social inequality.  Therefore, these groups, especially Lawati and Baluchi, have strong tribal 
ties and seek to reserve seats for themselves through male tribal candidates. For example, in 
Matrah province, one of the two winners is always a male Lawati because it is the homeland for 
Lawati people. Interestingly, in the 2011 elections a Lawati woman, a former ambassador, ran 
for office in Matrah, but the tribal support went to her male counterpart. The case within the 
Zanzibari group is different. Because Zanzibaris are originally Omanis, they hold the same tribe 
names as their counterpart ‘Arab’ Omanis. So, when it comes to elections, those who 
permanently live in Muscat in mixed communities do not consider tribal ties. Instead they might 
support a Zanzibari candidate, whether male or female. In addition, Zanzibari women in Oman 
were the first to enter the public sphere because of their educational experiences outside Oman 
(Peterson 2004). This indicates they are less likely to hold traditional gender ideologies. This 
background leads to the following hypothesis:  
H11.  Zanzibaris are more likely than others to support women’s membership in 
           Majlis al Shura. 
 
  According to Barber (2007), age affects the strength of tribal ties in Oman; the younger 
the individual, the weaker the tribal ties. This might be true within an individual level decision. 
However, in elections, tribal identity is prevalent over individual identity. Individuals vote for 
tribal candidates over their own preferences. In addition, a cross-national study found no 
generational shifts in cultural attitudes in post-Communist and developing societies (Norris and 
Inglehart 2001). Younger and older generations in these societies tend to be alike in holding 
traditional attitudes. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H12.  There is no relationship between age and support for women’s membership in 
Majlis al Shura.  
 
  
27 
In sum, despite strong indications of its importance in limiting women’s political 
representation in the Arab region, no empirical research has considered tribalism along with 
other determinants. In part, this could be due to the challenges of defining and measuring 
informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). However, without considering tribalism, a full 
understanding of the phenomenon is missed. This factor is important to explain why the Arab 
region holds the lowest rate of women in parliament in the world. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 POLITICAL REFORMS IN OMAN 
 
This chapter traces the nature and phases of political reforms in Oman introduced by 
Sultan Qaboos, since he came to power in 1970. The aim of these reforms was to deal with the 
issue of political participation in Oman during major changes in the political climate in and 
around the region, as will be discussed later. 
Oman is a sultanistic state (i.e. absolute monarchy). The Sultan Qaboos took power in a 
bloodless coup in 1970. Before that Oman suffered from isolation and a poor economic situation, 
which forced some Omanis to immigrate to east Africa and other gulf countries seeking 
education and job opportunities. The Sultan Qaboos is considered the leader of the ‘Renaissance 
Era’ in Oman. He is responsible for the transformation of the country to a modern state in all 
aspects: economic, politics, public services, and gender equality. Today, Oman has a high 
Human Development Index (0.783), and a Gender Inequality Index (GII) value of 0.348, ranking 
it 64 out of 149 countries in 2013 (United Nations Development Programme 2014). According to 
a study by the Thomson Reuters Foundation, Oman is the second best Arabian country in 
women’s rights (Kehoe 2013).  
 Over a period of four decades, political reforms have gradually established a popularly 
elected representative body in Oman; while this body does not have the full popular sovereignty 
or legislative authority of Western parliaments, since reforms in 2011 it is endowed in Basic Law 
not only with the power to propose legislation to the sultan but also with certain oversight over 
the state bureaucracy.  
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These reforms were implemented in three phases: the establishment of the State 
Consultative Council (SCC) in 1981; the Omani Consultative Council (OCC) in 1991; and the 
Council of Oman (the Consultative Council and State Council) in 1996. In his speeches and 
interviews, the Sultan emphasized the character of these reforms: that they are not meant to 
imitate others, but to develop something that it is unique for the Omani society. He stated that "it 
is not our intention to import foreign brands of democracy into this country; the democratic 
process that you are witnessing is, and must always be an Omani one, which accords with our 
people's culture, religion and traditions and particular needs" (The Middle East 1995). 
The State Consultative Council (1981-1990) 
 
The State Consultative Council (SCC) was mainly established to advise the government 
on economic and social policies/issues (Al-Haj 1996, Majlis al Shura 1997). The council had to 
submit its recommendations to the Sultan directly. It originally consisted of 45 members, 
including the chairman, who were all appointed by the Sultan. The council's membership 
included two sectors: government and public (provinces and business) with 17 and 28 members 
respectively.  In 1983, the number of the members was increased by a royal decree to 55: 18 
government representatives, 12 business representatives, and 25 provincial representatives. Some 
of the government representatives were undersecretaries of different services ministries.   
The SCC had its own budget and consisted of the Chairman office, a general secretariat, 
an executive bureau, and a number of permanent and temporary committees (Majlis al Shura 
1997). During its functional periods, it submitted many recommendations in different spheres: 
economic, social welfare, education, infrastructure and public services.  ‘Omanization’ — the 
replacement of expatriate workers with Omanis, was among the most important 
recommendations the council submitted in 1988 and was implemented rapidly.   
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According to Al-Haj (1996), even though the SCC did not have any legislative role, it 
presented a step toward political change in Oman. The Sultan's approach of incorporating 
citizens in domestic issues was different from the former Sultan's (his father) strategy that never 
used the principle of consultation. 
The Omani Consultative Council (OCC) 
 
 The second phase of political change in Oman was the replacement of the SCC with the 
Omani Consultative Council (OCC) in 1991. In his speech at the occasion of the 20th National 
Day, the Sultan announced the establishment of the OCC with the emphasis on greater public 
participation in the development process of the country.  He declared that " … to provide more 
opportunities for Omani citizens’ wider participation in the responsibilities and tasks in the 
construction of the Fatherland, we have decided upon the formation of a Majlis al Shura in which 
all the Wilayats [provinces] of the Sultanate are to be represented. There will be no government 
membership of this Majlis. The membership will be totally composed of representatives of the 
Wilayats. This is a further step on the road of participation which will serve the aspirations and 
ambitions of the citizens throughout Oman" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015).  
 The OCC started out in December 1991 with 59 members plus the chairman who was 
appointed by the Sultan. The 59 members represented the 59 provinces and they ran for office 
through provincial nomination and selection by the Sultan. Within each province, only men 
citizens had the right to run for office and tribal and opinion leaders were the only segment of the 
population who had the right to vote (not more than 100 persons). Through a secret ballot 
procedure, each province nominated the three top names to the government and the Sultan 
appointed the member (Majlis al Shura 2006).  
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 For the second term (1994-1997) elections, the representation system was changed based 
on population density (Majlis al Shura1997). Provinces that had a population of 30,000 and 
above had two representatives and those with less than 30,000 had one representative in the 
council, nominating four and two to the government accordingly. Therefore, the number of the 
members increased to 80 in the second term. In addition, the number of voters (still mainly tribal 
and opinion leaders) was increased to 200 persons for provinces with two representatives and 
100 persons for those with one representative. It was in this term when women for the first time 
had the right to vote and run for office. However, these rights were limited to women in the 
Muscat governorate (with six provinces) only, and two women made their way to the council. 
 Many changes were introduced in the third term (1997-2000) elections. Each province 
had at least 250 voters, and the number of member increased to 82. Other segments of society 
like business and educated persons were included in the voting process as well. In addition, 
women in governorates outside Muscat were given the right to vote. In contrast to the two 
previous terms, members were elected based on the voting results without government 
intervention, and members had the right to run for office for a second term (Majlis al Shura 
2004). 
 The fifth term (2003-2007) election was the first to be held under universal adult suffrage 
(Majlis al Shura 2008). All citizens (male and female) of age 21 and over were given the right to 
vote. The representation system remained the same; provinces with 30,000 and above held two 
seats and those with less than 30,000 held one seat in the council. In addition, the membership 
restriction was lifted; a member can run for office without restrictions on the number of 
reelections, and the term was extended to four years instead of three.  In regard to candidates, no 
changes or new rules were introduced. As specified before, a candidate must be of age 30 and 
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above, be of good repute in his/her province, have work experience and reasonable knowledge 
(no specified qualifications), and cannot hold a government job if elected.  
 A formal election campaign was introduced for the first time in the sixth term (2007-
2011) elections. Candidates were allowed to hold campaigns either through meetings with the 
public or through media, from the time of publishing the final list of candidates by the Ministry 
of Interior to the day prior to the elections. Candidates were allowed to announce their 
candidacies through publishing pamphlets, placing billboards, banners and posters in streets and 
public places, and publishing advertisements in the local press and on TV.  Advertisements were 
allowed only inside the province the candidate was contesting, and they only could have the 
picture of the candidate, his full name, address, work experience, and academic/practical 
qualifications.  
 Before the seventh term (2011-2015) elections, major changes were introduced in the 
Basic Statute of the State by a royal decree (99/2011). The amendments include election of the 
Chairman and two deputies by a majority of the 84 elected members in the council, and a 
provision that candidates must hold at least a high school diploma. Voter turnout was the highest 
(76%) for this term and just one woman got elected.  
Surprisingly, in 2015 elections for the eighth term (2015-2019) had the lowest voter 
turnout (56.6%). But more youths were elected, leading to around 70% new faces in the council 
(Kothaneth 2015). Again one woman (an incumbent) made her way to the office. Table 1 below 
presents a summary of all elections. 
The OCC has its own budget and administrative system composed of the office of the 
Chairman, a general secretariat, and committees. Before the seventh term, the council mainly 
acted as an advisory body for the government with very limited legislative roles (Al-Haj 1996). 
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However, an amendment introduced in 2011 following protests associated with the ‘Arab 
Spring’ granted the council greater legislative and oversight roles. It is now responsible for 
approving/amending draft laws referred to it by the government (the Council of Ministers); 
proposing new laws to the government; discussing/commenting on annual development projects, 
budget plans, and economic/social agreements/conventions before ratification; and reviewing the 
annual report of the State Audit Institution. It also has the power of interpellation of services 
ministers such as ministers of Education, Higher Education, Housing, and Transportation, 
according to a request presented by not less than 15 members, and to refer the results of 
interpellation directly to the Sultan (Majlis al Shura 2011).   
Table 1: Summary of elections data 
Term Candidates Elected Voter Turnout  
Male Female Male Female Total  Male  Female 
1st (1991-1994) - - 59 - - - - 
2nd (1994-1997) - - 78 2 - - - 
3rd (1997-2000) 709 27 80 2 (incumbents)  - - - 
4th (2000-2003) 519 21 81 2 65% 35% 30% 
5th (2003-2007) 491 15 81 2 (incumbents) - - - 
6th (2007-2011) 610 21 84 - 63% 60.7% 39.3% 
7th (2011-2015) 1056 77 83 1 76.6% - - 
8th (2015-2019) 570 20 84 1 (incumbent) 56.6% 32.8% 23.7% 
 
The State Council (SC) 
 
 In November 1996, The Sultan announced the Basic Statute of the State (al-Nizam al-
Asasi lil-Dawla), which stated the relationship between the state and its people. In Article 58, it 
described the formation of a new council, the State Council (Majlis al Dawla), alongside the 
Consultative Council, together making the Council of Oman (Majlis Oman) (Rabi 2002). The 
Sultan appoints members of the State Council for a four-year term. They constitute former 
officials (ministers, undersecretaries, ambassadors, and senior officers), tribal leaders, 
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academians, and outstanding Omanis. The State Council reviews everything referred by the 
Majlis al Shura in regard to laws, annual development and budget plans, and 
agreements/conventions.  According to Shaykh Hammud bin Abdallah al-Harthi, the first 
chairman of the council, the difference between the al Shura and al Dawla councils is the former 
is “more involved with constituency issues”; whereas, the latter “did not have to pay 
consideration to various groups and thus could help to set priorities, particularly financial 
priorities, for the country” (Rabi 2002, 46). In this sense, the Majlis al Shura serves as the lower 
house and Majlis al Dawla as the upper house. Currently, the council has 85 members, 13 are 
women (IPU 2015). 
It is worth mentioning, by the royal degree (99/2011), the chairmen of Majlis al Shura 
and Majlis al Dawla have been added to the process of deciding a successor to the throne. Article 
(6) states, "The Royal Family Council shall, within three days of the throne falling vacant, 
determine the successor to the throne. If the Royal Family Council does not agree on a choice of 
a Sultan for the Country, the Defense Council together with the Chairman of Majlis Al Dawla, 
the Chairman of Majlis al Shura, and the Chairman of the Supreme Court along with two of his 
most senior deputies, shall instate the person designated by His Majesty the Sultan in his letter to 
the Royal Family Council” (Ministry of Legal Affairs 2015). 
Explanations of Political Reforms in Oman and Other Gulf States 
The establishment of the Council of Oman (Majlis Oman), which consists of the State 
Council (Majlis al Dawla) and the Consultative Council (Majlis al Shura), was parallel with 
political changes in other Gulf States. In Kuwait, more power was given to the national assembly 
(Majlis al Umma) after liberation from Iraqi occupation; a Majlis al Shura was established in 
1993 in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain; Shikeh Hamed overthrew his father in 1995 and made drastic 
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changes in Qatar; and the National Federal Council in the United Arab Emirates recommenced 
its meetings in 1993 and made a major cabinet reappointment in 1997 (Ehteshami and Wright 
2007). Therefore, it is important to look at some interpretations of these political transformations.  
To explain these reforms, Rabi (2002) and Ehteshami (2003) rely on the ‘rentier model’. 
According to them, because the Gulf States support their societies economically through natural 
resources, such as oil, mines, land, and climate, they do not have an obligation of responding to 
their societies' demands for political participation. By contrast, states supported economically by 
their societies, through different forms of taxes, must respond to their societies' demands. 
Therefore, all political reforms in the Gulf States were from their respective rulers. These rulers 
initiated political reforms, not their civil societies. Ehteshami argues oil revenues strengthen 
rulers and "depoliticize" (58) people through benefits, such as free education and health care, 
government subsidized housing, food, electricity, petroleum, etc. Al-Farsi (2013) describes this 
model as a ‘social contract’ between the rulers and their citizens. According to him, this contract 
provides people with free services but “at the expense of their rights to political participation” 
(214).   
The rentier model clearly explains much of the political society in the Arab Peninsula; 
yet, just as clearly it does not fully capture the political processes during the past two decades. 
Despite oil resources, many states have felt the need to provide growing spaces for 
institutionalized political participation. Internally, the GCC states had economic pressures that 
resulted from paying the bills for liberating Kuwait from Iraq, and dealt concurrently with the 
long-term consequences of the ‘fiscal crisis’ of the mid 1980s (Ehteshami 2003). In addition, the 
new ‘democratic wave’ after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1989 caused major political 
movements in Iran and Yemen, which inspired the GCC population to demand economic and 
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political changes. All these threats were exacerbated by globalization, which brought mass media 
and pushed the Gulf States to introduce political reforms (Al-Haj 1996; Ehteshami 2003; Rabi 
2002).  
Taking into account the political structure of these states, Ehteshami and Wright (2007) 
argue the GCC rulers introduced these reforms to mainly safeguard their positions. Based on a 
tribal system, the GCC rulers have the desire to maintain their positions for a long time. Internal 
political activism is considered a threat in shifting power from tribal ruling families to civil 
societies, which means losing their “traditional tribal right” (915). They thought liberalization 
would fulfill their citizens’ appetites for change and increase their legitimacy at the same time. It 
would be perceived as ‘good governance,’ and accordingly they would be perceived as good 
rulers, since government is strongly tied to the ruling families in these states (Ehteshami 2003).   
Ehteshami and Wright (2007) also argue the United States’ intervention in and 
occupation of Iraq and the U.S. agenda for the ‘war on terror’ have increased the pace of reforms 
in these states. They believe funding for democracy promotion in this region through the Middle 
East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) will have a great impact on political reforms in the long term.  
In addition, U.S. and European Union funding for civil societies and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) will contribute to further changes and will lead anti-western Islamic 
parties to gain power in the region.   
Western scholars and institutions have criticized these political reforms and political 
developments in the Middle East, in general. They claim they have failed to produce 
‘democratic’ reforms (Jeremy and Ridout 2005). However, most of these views are based on 
comparisons with Western concepts without taking into account the social and cultural practices 
for each country in the region. In the case of Oman, Jeremy and Ridout believe the formation of 
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a constitution and the Council of Oman is a "gradual movement toward democratic practices" 
(378), which considers cultural factors in Oman, such as the principle of al shura (Consultation), 
cultural values of tolerance and compassion, tribal social status, etc. This interpretation is 
consistent with the Sultan’s statement of implementing a gradual democratic process.  
In summary, several internal and external factors have forced the rulers of the GCC states 
to introduce political reforms for the broader political participation of their people. Despite 
Western critics, they have succeeded in managing the state-society relationships to date. 
However, the GCC are not immune from future changes and further liberalization, especially 
given the Middle Eastern region is unstable, since the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutionary wave in 2010 
and the ongoing war in a neighbor state (Yemen). Moreover, an expected economic crisis due to 
dropping oil prices may cause more internal economic pressure for these ‘rentier’ states. This 
time, civil societies and NGOs in these states might be more prepared by the U.S. and the EU for 
challenging the ‘top-down’ model. In Oman, this might not be the case, at least in the short term. 
A recent study suggests the current generation is not ready to challenge the Omani political 
structure and initiate a ‘bottom-up’ political process, due to its support for the current state-
society relationship through Majlis al Shura (Al-Farsi 2013). According to Al-Farsi, the demand 
of the current generation is focused now on enhancing the legislative role of al Shura and other 
executive authorities. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 METHODOLOGY 
 
This study uses primary data that were collected using a self-administered survey 
questionnaire that was distributed to 500 Omani adults in the capital, Muscat, during the period 
of mid July–mid August 2015. Initially, the survey was translated into Arabic, the formal 
language of Oman. Twenty-five pretests were completed to uncover flaws and reveal an 
approximate time to complete the survey. Twenty pretests were emailed to friends and family 
members; whereas, the remaining five were face-to-face interviews where this researcher read 
the questions for interviewees.  In addition, a pilot study with 50 participants was conducted 
from the end of June to early July 2015. This pretest helped further refine the survey, add 
questions, and determine the best procedure for recruiting participants.  
Study participants were recruited from 13 organizations: 9 public, 3 private, and 1 
academic. Public organizations were chosen primarily because most public employees have 
permanent homes outside the capital Muscat and commute to Muscat to work during the week, 
which enabled me to survey participants who live in different regions of Oman. The private 
sector was targeted to contact employees with different ethnicities and levels of income, in 
particular Swahili and Baluchi. Academic institutions provided an opportunity to contact diverse 
demographic groups among students and professors, as well as those with higher education 
(Master/PhD) and high income.  Civil society organizations were also targeted to recruit retired 
people and those who don't work, especially housewives. But unfortunately most of these 
organizations were unwilling to help, and some lack access to the desired categories of retired 
people and housewives. Alternatively, I targeted public pension organizations to capture retired 
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people. However, I could only recruit few respondents through these organizations (11) because 
most pension services are provided online and it is rare for retired people to visit these 
organizations. I tried to capture housewives through religious lectures that were held in some 
mosques during the holy month of Ramadhan. But unluckily few of them attended these lectures 
and I came out with a very small number (5). 
I contacted the CEO or the head of public relations department in these organizations, 
handed them a letter explaining the purpose of the study, the targeted number of participants in 
each organization, and asking for permission to distribute the survey to their 
employees/members. The letter was accompanied with a copy of the survey and an approval 
letter from the Ministry of Higher Education to carry out the study. I got immediate permissions 
in only three organizations, wherein I walked into the offices introducing myself and asking the 
employees if they were willing to participate in my study.  Most employees welcomed me and 
participated voluntarily without promise of compensation. The rest of the organizations 
distributed the survey to their employees/members and I went back later to collect them. 
Generally, males were more cooperative than females. In most cases, I received back the exact 
targeted number of males and fewer of females. Consequently, I had to distribute the survey to 
females only in some organizations to reach the quota of 250. Also, I had few cases of females 
who refused to participate claiming that they were not interested in the topic at all.  
The sample was based on sex quota only: 250 males and 250 females. Quota sampling 
based on age and level of education, as initially proposed, was difficult to apply due to time 
constraints, and most organizations were unwilling to handle it. Cases with missing values on the 
model scale variables are omitted, which leaves us with 470 observations. 
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Variables and Measurements 
Independent variables 
This study includes two types of independent variables: public opinion and 
demographics. The three main public opinion variables are related to gender ideology, 
religiosity, and tribal affiliation. They are all measured by asking participants to respond to 
statements from "strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (5) on a five-point response scale. 
The scales are coded so the higher the score, the higher are egalitarian attitudes and religiosity, 
and the lower tribal affiliation. Table 2 presents a summary of these three variables.  
Table 2: Summary of three main independent variables 
Variable Concept Variable type and rage 
Gender1 On the whole, men make better political leaders than 
women do. 
 
 
 
Five-point scale  
1. Strongly agree 
2. Agree 
3. Neither agree nor 
disagree 
4. Disagree 
5. Strongly disagree 
Gender2 A university education is more important for a boy than 
for a girl. 
Gender3 When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a 
job than women. 
Gender4 For a woman, having a job is as important as being a 
mother. 
Religion1 Male and female university students should attend 
classes together.  
Religion2 It is acceptable for me to listen to music 
Religion3 It is acceptable for me to take "personal" loans from 
Banks 
Religion4 I don't mind a woman not wearing a hijab 
Tribal1 It is important for me to participate in my tribal events 
like attending ceremonies 
Tribal2 It is important to keep in contact with my tribal 
members  
Tribal3 It is important for me to be aware of my tribe's issues 
Tribal4   Tribal compatibility is important for me in deciding 
  whom to marry   
Tribal5 1. Tribal affiliation is an important part of my identity 
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For a "precise" measure of gender ideology, I use the first three statements (Gender1-
Gender3) from the World Values Survey, while the fourth statement (Gender4) is adopted from 
the Traditional-Egalitarian Sex- Role (TESR) scale (Larsen and Long 1988). Gender ideology is 
measured by taking the mean of Gender1-Gender3 (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.65).   
Religiosity is measured by asking participants to respond to four statements. The first 
(Religion1), third (Religion3), and fourth (Religion4) statements are adapted from the Arab 
Barometer Survey (Arab Barometer 2013), which collects individual-level opinions/attitudes in 
some Arab countries (i.e., Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, and Sudan) about 
political, social, cultural, and religious values. The second statement (Religion2), which is added 
by the researcher, is reasonable since listening to music in Islam is forbidden (Haram). 
Religiosity is calculated by taking the mean of Religion1-Religion3 (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.66).  
The third variable, tribal affiliation is measured by asking participants to respond to five 
statements (Tribal1-Tribal5), which the researcher developed. Usually, Omanis who have tribal 
affiliation are expected to participate in their tribal events, contact their tribal members, have 
knowledge about their tribes' matters, have restrictions in marrying outside their tribes, and 
consider tribal affiliation a major part of their identity. By factor analysis, these five statements 
are separated into two variables: Tribal participation, which is calculated by taking the mean of 
Tribal1-Tribal3, and Tribal identity, which is the mean of Tribal4-Tribal5. They have 
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.83 and 0.67, respectively.  
Other variables that are also incorporated in the model include political interest, political 
knowledge about the actual level of women’s representation in the council, and the importance 
of tribal nomination for vote choice. Political interest is measured by taking the average of two 
variables: interest, which captures how much an individual is interested in Majlis al Shura 
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elections; and follow news, which captures how often an individual follows news about the 
elections. Both of the two variables (interest and follow news) are measured on a four-point 
response scale, which are reversed coded so the higher the score the greater the individual’s 
political interest. Political knowledge about the actual level of women’s representation in the 
council is measured by asking participants to write down the current number of women members 
in the council or to check the “I don’t know” box if they have no idea. The variable is coded as a 
dichotomous; where 1 means the number written is right and 0 means the number is wrong or the 
“ I don’t know” box is checked. The importance of tribal nomination for vote choice is measured 
by asking participants to respond from "Very Important" (1) to "Not Important" (4) on a four-
point response scale. The scale is reversed coded so the higher the score, the more important the 
tribal nomination is to an individual in considering a candidate.  
Two dichotomous variables of influence are created to distinguish between the influences 
of males’ opinions and females’ opinions on an individual in selecting a candidate: male 
influence and female influence. Participants are provided with a list of people (Father, mother, 
brother, sister, husband, wife, male friend, female friend, male colleague, female colleague, tribal 
leader, and religious leader) and they are asked to check those whose opinions they might 
consider in selecting a candidate. Checking any male persons means male influence is 1, and 
checking any female persons means female influence is 1. Table 3 presents a summary of these 
variables. 
The other set of independent variables are demographic. They include sex, age, marital 
status, children, permanent place of residence, level of education, current employment status, and 
monthly income. Sex, children, and ethnicity are the only dichotomous variables. Age, level of 
education, and monthly income are continuous whereas marital status, permanent place of 
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residence, current and employment status are nominal. I collapsed the nominal variables into 
dichotomous variables (Married, Capital, and Employment) where 1 means the individual is 
married, living in the capital and working and 0 means the individual is not married, not living in 
the capital, and not working. Table 4 presents a summary of these demographic variables.  
 
Table 3: Summary of other independent variables 
Label Concept Variable type and range 
Political 
interest 
How interested an individual is in Majlis al Shura 
elections, and how often he follows news about 
the elections.  
 
Four-point response scale 
1=Very interested 
     Very often 
2=Somewhat interested 
    Often 
3=Not very interested 
    Sometimes/rarely 
4=Not at all interested 
    Never 
 
Political 
knowledge 
Political knowledge about the actual level of 
women’s representation in the council 
Dichotomous  
0 = No knowledge 
1= Has knowledge 
 
Tribal 
nomination 
The importance of tribal nomination to an 
individual when he considers candidate’s 
characteristics 
 
Four-point response scale 
 
1= Very important 
2= Somewhat important 
3= A little important 
4= Not important 
Male 
influence 
The influence of males’ opinions (Father or 
brother or husband or male friend or male 
colleague or tribal leader or religious leader) on 
an individual in selecting a candidate.  
Dichotomous  
0 = Did not check male 
persons 
1= checked male persons 
 
Female 
influence  
The influence of females’ opinions (Mother, 
sister, wife, female friend, female colleague) on 
an individual in selecting a candidate. 
Dichotomous  
0 = Did not check female 
persons 
1= checked female persons 
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Table 4: Summary of demographic independent variables 
Label Concept Variable type and range 
Sex Sex Dichotomous  
0 = Female 
1 = Male 
 
Age Age Ordered categorical ranging from 1 to 5 
 
Marital status Collapsed to Married 
or other 
Dichotomous 
0 = Other  
1 = Married 
 
Children Have children living 
at home 
Dichotomous 
0 = No children 
1 = Has children 
 
Permanent place of 
residence 
Collapsed to capital or 
other 
Dichotomous 
0= Other  
1= Capital 
 
Level of education Level of education Ordered categorical ranging from: 1 to 5 
 
Employment Collapsed to 
employee or not an 
employee 
Dichotomous 
0= Not an employee 
1= Employee 
 
Income Monthly income Ordered categorical ranging from 1 to 6 
 
Ethnicity Factor that captures if 
an individual speak 
Arabic only or Arabic 
and other languages 
 
Dichotomous 
0= Arabic only 
1= Arabic and other languages 
 
 
Dependent variables 
 My theory suggests that the relationship between tribalism and religiosity and the 
dependent variable (Support for women) is mediated by gender ideology (Baron and Kenny 
1986). In this case, gender ideology functions as both independent and dependent variable. Thus 
my model has two dependent variables: gender ideology and support for women's membership in 
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Majlis al Shura. The variable gender ideology is calculated as the mean of Gender1-Gender3, as 
illustrated above. Support for women's membership in Majlis al Shura is constructed from 
responses to three questions: “Out of the 84 members of Majlis al Shura, what percentage would 
you prefer to be women?” “How important do you think it is to have women as members in 
Majlis al Shura?” and “How important do you think it is for women to run for office?” The 
responses to the first question are ordered categorically ranging from 1 to 8. The other two 
questions are measured by asking participants to respond from "Very important" (1) to "Not 
important at all" (5) on a five-point response scale. Since these three items have different ranges, 
they were standardized on a 0 to 1 scale to make support a continuous variable. Support is 
calculated by taking the average of these three items (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.83). The second and 
third items are reversed coded so the higher the score, the more important women’s membership 
in the council and women’s running for office to an individual. Table 5 presents a summary of 
the dependent variables.  
 
Table 5: Summary of dependent variables 
Variable Concept Variable type and range 
Gender ideology Captures an individual’s 
attitudes towards women’s 
role in society.  
 
Five-point scale ranging from: 
Strongly agree to strongly 
disagree 
Support Captures an individual’s level 
of support for women’s 
membership in the council by 
responding to three questions.  
 
Continuous 
Ranging from low support (0) 
to high support (1)  
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CHAPTER 5 
 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
Descriptive Analyses 
Table 6 presents a summary of simple statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum) for the dependent and independent variables. The results show that all variables have 
small standard deviations, which indicates that, on average, the values are close to their means.  
Table 6. Simple Statistics  
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum  Maximum 
 
Support  0.491 0.248 0 1 
Gender Ideology 2.785 0.936 1 5 
Tribal Participation 2.011 0.750 1 5 
Tribal Identity  2.678 1.028 1 5 
Religiosity  3.250 0.923 1 5 
Age  1.742 0.879 1 5 
Sex 0.506 0.500 0 1 
Education Level 3.562 0.998 1 5 
Employment Status 0.841 0.365 0 1 
Monthly Income 2.991 1.163 1 6 
Ethnicity  0.099 0.299 0 1 
Permanent Place of Residence  0.519 0.500 0 1 
Marital Status  0.673 0.469 0 1 
Children  0.699 0.459 0 1 
Tribal Nomination  1.880 1.017 1 5 
Male Influence  0.809 0.393 0 1 
Female Influence  0.422 0.494 0 1 
Political Interest  2.408 0.811 1 4 
Political Knowledge  0.158 0.365 0 1 
Tribal Participation * Sex 0.943 1.059 0 5 
Tribal Identity * Sex 1.319 1.495 0 5 
Male Influence * Sex 0.389 0.488 0 1 
Female Influence * Sex 0.166 0.373 0 1 
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Table 7 presents frequencies for some public opinion variables. The results show that 
55.7% of the sample reported that they are interested in the elections, but the majority (67.5%) 
doesn’t regularly follow elections news. Also, 56.6% of the sample had never voted before, 
compared to 43.4% who had voted in at least one of previous elections. In regard to attitudes 
about the importance of women in the council, the majority believes it is important for women to 
run for office and become members in the council. But the modal preferable percentage of 
women in the council is 1%-10%, and only 9.4% of the sample doesn’t want any women in the 
council. Interestingly, only 15.5% of the sample knows the number of women members in the 
council. For this year’s elections, the sample is divided almost equally between those who would 
vote and those who would possibly not vote. And the majority reported that they would vote for 
a woman candidate if there were one running for office in their province. 
Table 8 presents mean levels for the scale variables broken down by sex. It indicates that 
women have more egalitarian attitudes and they are more supportive of women compared to 
men. Men, on the other hand, have greater tribal affiliation and religiosity, and they are more 
interested in politics than women. In addition, they are more aware of the number of women 
members in the council than women themselves. The size of the gender gap in tribal participation 
is the largest, while the smallest gender gap is in the knowledge both men and women have about 
the number of women members in the council. Looking closely at tribal affiliation, there is a 
significant gender gap in tribal participation but not in tribal identity. This indicates that tribal 
identity is equally as important to men as to women.  
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Table 7: Frequencies of some variables 
Variable  Categories  Percent (%) 
 
Interest  Very interested 11.75 
Somewhat interested 44.02 
Not very interested 31.62 
Not at all interested 12.61 
Follow News Very often 11.09 
Often 21.32 
Sometimes/rarely 48.61 
Never 18.98 
Voted  Voted in previous elections 43.40 
Never voted before  56.60 
Women membership 
 
 
 
 
Very important 32.41 
Important 21.96 
Somewhat important 26.01 
A little important 13.86 
Not important at all 5.76 
Women Running for Office  Very important 28.09 
Important 24.89 
Somewhat important 23.83 
A little important 16.81 
Not important at all 6.38 
Preferable percentage of 
women members in the council  
None 9.48 
1%-10% 37.50 
11%-20% 16.16 
21%-30% 14.01 
31%-40% 10.34 
41%-49% 2.16 
50% 8.41 
More than 50% 1.94 
Voting in this year elections Definitely 17.48 
Very likely 10.87 
Somewhat likely 20.68 
A little 26.44 
Not at all 24.52 
Voting for a woman candidate  Definitely 9.06 
Very likely 11.81 
Somewhat likely 31.50 
A little 20.08 
Not at all 14.57 
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Table 8: Mean gender difference in attitudes 
        Sex 
 
Variable 
 
Male Female Difference (Men-
Women) 
Significance test 
(p-value) 
Gender Ideology 2.39 3.19 - 0.8 <.0001  
Religiosity 3.41 3.09 0.32 0.0002  
Tribal Participation 3.09 2.17 0.92 <.0001  
Tribal Identity 2.61 2.76 - 0.15 0.1179  
Support 0.43 0.56 - 0.13 <.0001  
Political Interest 2.58 2.22 0.36 <.0001  
Political Knowledge 0.20 0.11 0.09 0.0213  
 
Multivariate Analyses 
 
Based on my theoretical model, the hypotheses I am testing propose that certain 
independent variables help to explain the variance in two dependent variables: gender ideology 
and support for women’s membership in Majlis al Shura. Thus, I test two different models, one 
for each of the dependent variables. They are the following: 
Gender Ideology = f (tribal participation + tribal identity + religiosity + sex + age + marital 
status + children + permanent place of residence + level of education + monthly income + 
employment status + ethnicity + tribal nomination + male influence + female influence + 
political interest + political knowledge + tribal participation * sex + tribal identity * sex + male 
influence * sex + female influence * sex) 
Support = f (gender ideology + sex + age + marital status + children + permanent place of 
residence + level of education + monthly income + employment status + ethnicity + tribal 
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nomination + male influence + female influence + political interest + political knowledge + tribal 
participation * sex + tribal identity * sex + male influence * sex + female influence * sex) 
I test these hypotheses with Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), which simultaneously 
calculates regression coefficients for direct and indirect relationships. This is a powerful tool to 
examine cause and effect within a theoretical model, and fit indices suggest models fit. The Chi-
square static is small (4.284), and its corresponding p-value (0.232) is larger than 0.05 criterion. 
Other fit indices also show good fit: The AGFI is 0.924, which is larger than 0.90, the RMSEA is 
essentially zero (0.030), and Hoelter Critical N is 821. Table 9 below presents the results for the 
two dependent variables. It includes the standardized beta coefficients and the t-ratio to indicate 
the direction of the relationship and the significance level for each independent variable that I am 
testing. Significant values are in bold.  
Two main hypotheses (H2 and H3) are examined in the first model, in which gender 
ideology is the dependent variable. Cross-national studies posit that Islam has significant 
influence on women’s political representation because it is highly associated with traditional 
attitudes towards women. In fact, religiosity is significantly related to gender ideology in Oman. 
The result is consistent with what was proposed in H2: the greater the religiosity the lower 
egalitarian attitudes towards women.  
 I have proposed that tribal affiliation would have a strong explanatory power on gender 
ideology because tribes are based on a patriarchal structure and they play a clear role in 
nominating the candidates. In addition, some Arabic and African case studies suggest that tribe 
and ethnic-based patronage politics limits women’s opportunities in politics. But the strength of 
tribal affiliation is not significantly related to gender ideology in Oman.  There is thus no support 
for H3. However, a different measure of the importance of tribes (Tribal nomination) is 
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statistically significant. The more important tribal nomination is to an individual in selecting a 
candidate, the less egalitarian attitudes toward women an individual has. 
Table 9: Beta coefficients and t-ratio for two dependent variables: Gender ideology and 
support  
            Dependent variable  
 
 
 
Independent variable 
Gender ideology 
 
Support 
 
Beta coefficient 
 
t-ratio  Beta coefficient 
 
t-ratio  
Gender Ideology  - - 0.500 12.168 
Tribal Participation -0.017 -0.290 - - 
Tribal Identity  0.065 1.056 - - 
Tribal Nomination  -0.104 -2.516 0.004 0.104 
Religiosity -0.154 -3.724 - - 
Sex -0.388 -2.278 0.029 0.218 
Age 0.031 0.612 0.126 2.509 
Marital Status  -0.071 -1.454 -0.057 -1.214 
Children  -0.007 -0.163 -0.058 -1.410 
Permanent residence in capital 0.090 2.145 0.057 1.388 
Level of education  -0.029 -0.581 -0.033 -0.688 
Monthly income  0.162 2.629 -0.067 -1.112 
Employment -0.042 -0.780 -0.039 -0.764 
Ethnicity  0.012 0.294 -0.052 -1.265 
Male influence  -0.043 -0.624 0.001 0.017 
Female influence  0.085 1.364 0.032 0.542 
Political interest  0.075 1.674 0.135 3.131 
Political knowledge  0.084 1.986 -0.077 -1.883 
Tribal Participation * Sex 0.047 0.381 0.091 0.987 
Tribal Identity * Sex -0.045 -0.361 -0.117 -1.351 
Male influence * Sex -0.063 -0.565 -0.078 -0.724 
Female influence * Sex 0.062 0.936 -0.035 -0.551 
 
R-square  0.301 0.341 
 
 
Other public opinion and demographic independent variables are incorporated in the first 
model to explore how they help explain the variance in gender ideology. Sex, permanent place of 
residence, monthly income, and political knowledge about the actual level of women’s 
representation in Majlis al Shura are significantly related to gender ideology. Females and 
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individuals who live in the capital, with higher income, and aware of the number of women in 
the council hold more egalitarian attitudes toward women. Age, ethnicity, female influence, and 
political interest are positively but not significantly related to gender ideology. Individuals who 
are married, have children, have a higher level of education, and working hold less egalitarian 
attitudes toward women. Lastly, all the interaction terms between sex and tribal participation, 
tribal identity, male influence and female influence fail to reach statistical significance level. 
This model explains 30.1% of the variance in gender ideology. Neither societal structure and 
values (Tribalism) nor social factors could help explaining this phenomenon, which is an 
important determinant of support of women in the council, as posited in the second model.   
 The main hypothesis (H1) for the second model is: the greater the gender ideology, the 
greater the support for women’s membership in Majlis al-Shura. Cross-national studies suggest 
that attitudes toward women have a more significant influence on women's political 
representation more than social and political factors. Indeed, this is the case in Oman. Gender 
ideology is significantly related to support for women in the council, which supports H1. 
 H4, H5, and H6 posit socioeconomic status (education, income, and employment) is not 
an important determinant of support for women in Majlis al Shura. The results are consistent 
with what was proposed in these three hypotheses. Level of education, income, and employment 
status are not significantly related to support for women. It was proposed that marital status (H7) 
and whether an individual has children or not (H8) would not be significantly related to support 
for women. The analysis supports these two hypotheses. Neither is an important determinant. 
The relationship between these two variables and support is negative, which means married 
individuals and those with children are less supportive of women’s representation.  
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 Although sex turned out to be significantly related to gender ideology, this is not the case 
with support for women. Sex is unimportant as a direct determinant of support for women in the 
council as posited in H9, though it is indirectly associated with support through its effect on 
gender ideology. Whether an individual lives in the capital or not is also not directly significantly 
associated with support for women, contrary to H10. H11 proposes individuals who speak 
Swahili are more likely to support women than others who don’t, but ethnic background is not 
related to support. Whether an individual speaks Arabic only or Arabic and other languages is 
not significant, contrary to H11. In fact, analysis shows that individuals who speak Arabic and 
other languages are less supportive of women in Majlis al Shura than those who speak Arabic 
only, though differences are not statistically significant.   
Finally, somewhat surprisingly, age is an important determinant of support for women. It 
is positively related to support: the older an individual, the greater the support for women. This is 
the opposite of what would be expected in a tribal society. Usually, older people have stronger 
tribal affiliation than younger persons, and thus are less supportive of women in public life. 
However, this could be explained by considering the relationship between age and gender 
ideology on one hand and between tribal affiliation and gender ideology, which both turned out 
to be insignificant.  
Other interesting findings in this model are that political interest is significantly related to 
support for women. The greater the political interest of an individual, the more supportive he is 
for women. Tribal nomination, male or female influence, gender political knowledge are all not 
directly important determinants of support for women. However, some of them (tribal 
nomination and gender political knowledge) are indirectly associated with support through their 
effect on gender ideology. As in the first model, all of the interaction terms turned out to be 
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statistically insignificant. This model explains 34.1% of the variance in support for women in 
Majlis al Shura. Surprisingly, none of the tested determinants turned out to be significant in both 
models.  
Separate analysis for males and females show consistent significance for religiosity in the 
first model and gender ideology in the second one. Interestingly, children and female influence 
are important determinants for gender ideology among men, while marriage is significant among 
women. This means men who have children and are influenced by women are less conservative. 
On the other hand, marriage makes women more conservative. See the appendix A for detailed 
results.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study investigated the supply-side determinants of supporting women’s 
representation in Majlis al Shura in Oman. It incorporated cross-nationally recognized factors 
(gender ideology and religion) with a factor largely unexplored until now (tribalism). The 
researcher has argued the importance of considering tribalism to fully understand the low 
proportion of women’s legislative representation in the Arab region. 
By using survey data from 500 Omani adults in the capital Muscat, this study replicated 
two main findings from previous cross-national studies. First, it found that ideological beliefs 
toward women are important predictors of support for women in Majlis al Shura. Individuals 
with egalitarian attitudes about women are more supportive of women’s representation in the 
parliament than individuals with traditional attitudes. Second, religion is highly associated with 
traditional attitudes toward women. Individuals with greater religiosity, have less egalitarian 
attitudes toward women.  
Furthermore, this study confirms that cultural factors rather than social/structural ones 
(education, income, employment status) that matter in explaining women’s legislative 
representation.  And there is no generational shift in cultural attitudes. Younger and older 
generations are alike in holding traditional attitudes, confirming Norris and Inglehart’s (2001) 
finding about developing societies. However, the significant effect of age on support for 
women’s representation in Majlis al Shura is a striking finding-the older an individual, the 
greater the support for women in Majlis al Shura. One explanation for this could be the historical 
participation of Omani women in meetings with men discussing tribal and political issues 
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(Andriyanova 2011). Thus, older individuals, who are aware of Oman’s political history and 
traditions, do not mind including women in the council, whereas the younger individuals who 
lack this awareness (Al-Farsi 2013) and might be affected by some fundamentalist Islamic ideas 
in neighboring countries oppose women’s representation in the council, and in the public sphere 
in general.  
In contrast to the researcher’s expectation, tribal affiliation is not a significant 
determinant of gender ideology or support of women’s representation in Majlis al Shura. This 
result may be due to the difficulty of measuring tribalism, as reporting that tribal nomination is 
important for vote choice is associated with traditional gender attitudes. The more important 
tribal nomination is to an individual in selecting a candidate, the less egalitarian attitudes toward 
women an individual has.  
In respect to gender gap differences, Omani women are more pro-women than are Omani 
men. They hold more egalitarian attitudes toward women than men, and they are more 
supportive of women in the council as well. But, they are less interested in politics, and less 
aware of the actual number of women in Majlis al Shura then are men. This finding suggests that 
the ‘gender affinity effect’ in politics might not be as effective in Oman as in Western societies. 
Omani female candidates might lack the support of women in encouraging them to run for office, 
and vote for them.     
Oman was the first state in the Arab Peninsula to enfranchise women and grant them the 
right to run for office. But to present, it holds the second lowest rate of women in the legislature, 
after Qatar that has no woman representative in its parliament. The advancement of women’s 
legislative representation in some Gulf States comes from the adoption of gender quota, like in 
Saudi Arabia where women’s rate is 19.9%, or the nature of electoral system that includes some 
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royally appointed members, like the case in the United Arab Emirates where women make up 
22.5% of the parliament (IPU 2015). In states where elections are held by universal suffrage, like 
the case in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman, the proportions of women are low: 7.5%, 1.5%, and 
1.2%, respectively.   
Economic development in Oman during the past forty-five years did not bring massive 
cultural changes, as some modernization theorists claimed. Instead, its effect seems to be linked 
to the historical and cultural context of the Omani society. This ‘limited’ cultural change 
challenges the political future of Omani women as well as of women in most prosperous 
societies, like the United States, where gender equality in politics has still not been reached. 
Although attitudes are not bedrock and they can change over time, it is hard to alter them if they 
are associated with religion, as is the case in Oman.  
However, it is not impossible to gain societal acceptability for women in politics and 
public sphere, in general, because religion is not a static factor. There are various interpretations 
of religious texts regarding women’s role in society. These different interpretations are reflected 
in the facts that there are some Islamic states that have been led by women, like Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. Also, Islam has no effect on the gender gap in political participation in Muslim-
majority countries (Coffé and Dilli 2015). On the individual level, religiosity is not fixed as well. 
In Oman, while some individuals support women’s participation in public sphere, others support 
women in women dominated jobs only, and others do not accept women at all.  
Introducing a ‘temporary’ gender quota in Majlis al Shura might help increase social 
acceptability for women in the council on one hand, and motivate women to actively participate 
in politics by contesting in elections, and influence their decisions to run for office on the other 
hand. However, this step has to be accompanied by continuous educational programs about the 
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importance of women’s legislative representation, and provide women with the necessary skills 
and experiences to motivate them politically.  
This study has some limitations that need to be noted. First, the non-representative 
sample limits generalizability of the findings. Future research should at least attempt to obtain a 
more diverse sample in terms of demographic factors such as age, place of residency, and level 
of education. The second limitation relates to reliability assessment of some scale variables. 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for gender ideology (0.65), religiosity (0.66), and tribal identity 
(0.67) are below the acceptable level (0.70).  
Despite these limitations, this study confirms that cultural factors (gender ideology and 
religion) have the strongest explanatory power on support for women’s representation in Majlis 
al Shura. The significant effect of tribal nomination on attitudes toward women indicates the 
importance of considering tribalism in this topic, and that understanding the effect of tribalism 
on women’s political representation may require more in depth research. Schatz (2004,109) 
emphasizes, “Clans are among those political phenomena that are hard to quantify. They are 
concealable, often invisible, private, and hotly contested. They are not election results or interest 
rates; they lend themselves poorly to quantification.”  
This researcher hopes to inspire scholars to carry further research and test the impact of 
tribalism on women’s political representation in Oman or anywhere in the Arabic region. For 
example, future research could examine the role of tribal leaders in nominating and supporting 
male candidates. Understanding who participate in elections and why, may also help reveal the 
role of tribalism in this phenomenon.  
In addition, future research could measure Omanis’ perceptions about the need of 
women’s intellectual resources and human capital in the Omani political system or the Omani 
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economy. This measurement would reveal to what extent Omanis acknowledge the need of 
incorporating women in the political and economic arenas for Oman to ‘survive’ in this 
contemporary world and not to be left behind. This functional argument might be important in 
explaining the Omani citizens’ levels of support for women in the legislature.  For cross-national 
analysis, future research could use the Clan Governance Index (Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen 
2015) to examine the relationship between clan-based societies and women’s political 
representation. 
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APPENDIX A 
SEPARATE ANALYSIS FOR MALES AND FEMALES 
 
The results of conducting analysis separately for males and females show that religiosity, 
permanent place of residence, children, female influence, and political interest are significantly 
related to gender ideology for males and gender ideology is the only important determinant of 
support for women’s representation among males. Although monthly income, the importance of 
tribal nomination, and knowledge about actual level of women’s representation in the council 
turned out to be insignificant for males in the first model, their sizes are within the confidence 
intervals of these coefficients in the primary model.  As well, age and political interest are not 
important determinants of support for women but their sizes are very close to the sizes of these 
coefficients in the primary model. Table 10 presents standardized results of both models for males.  
For females, religiosity and marital status are the only important determinants of gender 
ideology. They are both negatively related to gender ideology: individuals with greater 
religiosity, and those who are married hold lower egalitarian attitudes towards women. For the 
second model, gender ideology, monthly income, children, and political interest are significantly 
related to support for women in Majlis al Shura. Women with higher egalitarian attitudes, higher 
political interest, and who have children are more supportive of women’s representation, while 
those with higher income are less supportive. Monthly income, permanent place of residence, 
tribal nomination, and gender political knowledge turned out to be insignificant determinants of 
gender ideology but their sizes are within the confidence intervals of these coefficients in the 
primary model. Age also is unimportant as a determinant of support for women but its size is 
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within the confidence interval of this coefficient in the primary model.  Table 11 presents the 
standardized results of both models for females.  
   Table 10: Beta coefficients and t-ratio for males 
                  Dependent variable 
 
 
 
Independent variable 
Gender ideology 
 
Support 
 
Beta 
coefficient 
 
t-ratio  Beta  
coefficient 
t-ratio  
Gender ideology - - 0.493  9.146 
Tribal participation 0.037  0.536  - - 
Tribal identity 0.0195  0.294  - - 
Religiosity -0.198  -3.253  - - 
Age 0.125  1.575  0.133  1.812  
Marital status 0.034  0.425  -0.020  -0.278  
Children 0.153  2.419  0.014  0.242  
Permanent place of residence 
 
0.126  1.999  0.065  1.109 
Level of education 0.074  0.933  -0.087 -1.195  
Monthly income  0.115  1.246  -0.009  -0.111  
Employment 
 
0.004  0.054  -0.012  -0.179  
Ethnicity 0.025  0.378  -0.078  -1.285  
Tribal nomination -0.113  -1.797  0.030  0.526  
Male influence -0.102  -1.518  -0.043  -0.699  
Female influence 0.166  2.551  -0.005  -0.092  
Political interest 0.148  2.254  0.050  0.853  
Political knowledge 0.060  0.942  -0.045  -0.775  
R-square  0.210  0.3185  
  
67 
   Table 11: Beta coefficients and t-ratio for females 
                 Dependent variable 
 
 
 
Independent variable 
Gender ideology 
 
Support 
 
Beta 
coefficient 
 
t-ratio  Beta coefficient t-ratio  
Gender ideology - - 0.441 8.101  
Tribal participation -0.038  -0.542 - - 
Tribal identity 0.057  0.842  - - 
Religiosity -0.141  -2.171  - - 
Age -0.056  -0.759  0.079  1.194  
Marital status -0.184 -2.570  -0.091  -1.416  
Children -0.130 -1.936  0.130  2.153  
Permanent place of residence 
 
0.061  0.960  0.046  0.800  
Level of education -0.073 -1.098  -0.018  -0.307  
Monthly income  0.117  1.699  -0.165  -2.665  
Employment 
 
0.012  0.178  -0.099  -1.585  
Ethnicity 0.009  0.146  -0.035  -0.615  
Tribal nomination -0.114 -1.757  -0.012  -0.222  
Male influence -0.070  -0.982  -0.000  -0.005  
Female influence 0.107 1.516  -0.009  -0.153  
Political interest -0.002  -0.030  0.216  3.571  
Political knowledge 0.130 1.945  -0.102  -1.709  
R-square  0.140 0.3040  
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APPENDIX B 
THE SURVEY 
 
Worldwide, women’s representation in politics is a controversial issue. Some people 
support women’s participation in politics while others believe that it is not an appropriate field for 
them. I want to know your opinion about this important topic.  This survey should take about five 
minutes of your time to complete.  The results will be made public to the people of Oman and be 
used to complete a Master's degree thesis. 
Your responses are voluntary and will be confidential. Responses will not be identified 
by individual. All responses will be compiled together and analyzed as a group. Data will be 
saved in a secure place and nobody will get access to it. If you have any questions or concerns 
now or after you have completed the survey, please contact me at the email and phone number 
provided below. If you have further concerns, you may also contact my advisor, Dr. Amy Erica 
Smith, Assistant Professor, at +(515) 294-1116 or aesmith2@iastate.edu. 
 
Thank you, 
Ahlam Al Subhi 
aalsubhi@iastate.edu 
+ 96899347382 
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1 How interested would you say you are in Majlis al 
Shura elections? 
 
1) Very interested 
2) Somewhat interested 
3) Not very interested 
4) Not at all interested 
 
2 How often do you follow news about Majlis al Shura  
elections? 
1) Very often 
2) Often 
3) Sometimes/rarely 
4) Never 
 
3 Which of the previous Majlis al Shura elections  
 have you participated in as a voter? Check all that 
apply.  
  
      2003 
      2007 
      2011 
I have never voted 
 
4 When you consider candidate's characteristics, would 
you say that each of the following characteristics is 
very important, somewhat important, a little 
important, or not important? 
      Very 
  Important 
   Somewhat 
important 
    A little  
  important  
   Not  
important 
 
Important 
 Educational qualification 
 
1 2 3 
 
 
4 
 
Age 1 2 3 
 
4 
Sex 1 2 3 
 
4 
Tribal nomination 1 2 3 
 
4 
Village affiliations 1 2 3 
 
4 
Economic status 1 2 3 
 
4 
(1-5) The following questions are about your interest in Majlis al Shura elections. Please answer each 
question as indicated.    
!!
 !!
 !!
 !!
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No Statement  Strongly 
  Agree  
Agree  Neither 
agree 
Nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
6 On the whole, men make better political leaders 
than women do. 
1 2  3 4 5 
7 A university education is more important for a 
boy than for a girl. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 When jobs are scarce, men should have more 
right to a job than women. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 For a woman, having a job is as important as  
being a mother 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Community participation 1 2 3 
 
4 
The way he/she runs a campaign  
 
1 2 3 
 
4 
Other persons' opinions 1 2 3 
 
4 
5 If you do consider other persons' opinions in 
selecting your candidate, who is this person/persons? 
Check all that 
apply. 
      Father 
      Mother 
      Brother 
      Sister 
      Husband 
      Wife 
      Male friend 
      Female friend 
      Male colleague 
      Female colleague   
      Tribal leader  
      Religious leader 
    Other   Specify _______________ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(6 - 18) Please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, strongly disagree, disagree, or neither agree nor 
disagree 
 with each of the following statements.  
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10 Male and female university students should 
attend classes together 
1 2 3 4 5 
11 It is acceptable for me to listen to music 1 2 3 4 5 
12 It is acceptable for me to take "personal" loans 
from banks 
1 2 3 4 5 
13 I don't mind a woman not wearing a hijab 1 2 3 4 5 
14 It is important for me to participate in my tribal 
events like attending ceremonies  
1 2 3 4 5 
15 It is important to keep in contact with my tribal 
members 
1 2 3 4 5 
16 It is important for me to be aware of my tribe's 
issues 
1 2 3 4 5 
17   Tribal compatibility is important for me in  
  deciding whom to marry   
1 2 3 4 5 
18 2. Tribal affiliation is an important part of my identity 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
19 As part of my thesis, I would like to know how 
much information people receive about Majlis al 
Shura.Without looking it up, would you happen to 
know how many women are currently serving as 
members in Majlis al Shura? Please write the 
number on the blank.  
If you don't know off the top of your head, please 
just check the box that says " I don’t know." 
 
    _____ 
 
         I don't know 
  
20 Out of the 84 members of Majlis al Shura, what  
percentage would you prefer to be women?   
 
1) None 
2) 1% - 10%      (1-8 women) 
3) 11% - 20%    (9-16 women) 
4) 21% - 30%    (17- 25 women) 
5) 31% - 40%    (26- 33 women) 
6) 41% - 49%    (34-41 women) 
7) 50%               (42 women) 
8) More than 50% (more than 42 women) 
 
21 How important do you think it is to have women as  
members in Majlis al Shura? 
 
1) Very important 
2) Important 
3) Somewhat important 
4) A little important 
5) Not important at all 
 
(19-28) The following questions are about women's representation in Majlis al Shura. Please answer  
each question as indicated.    
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22 How important do you think it is for women to run 
for  
office?  
1) Very important 
2) Important 
3) Somewhat important 
4) A little important 
5) Not important at all 
 
23 Have you ever voted for a woman candidate?  1) No 
2) Yes 
3) I have never voted 
 
For this year elections,  
24  How likely you are going to vote? 1) Definitely 
2) Very likely 
3) Somewhat likely 
4) A little 
5) Not at all 
 
25 How many women, if any, are running in your 
province?  
  
1) None 
2) One 
3) Two or more 
4) I don't know 
26 Have you already decided whom to vote for? 1) Yes  ----- Go to Question (27) 
2) No   ----- Go to Question (28) 
3) I am not going to vote ---- Go to Question (29) 
27 If you have decided whom to vote for, is this person 
a woman? 
1) Yes ------ Go to Question (29) 
2) No -------  Go to Question (29) 
3) There is no woman running in my province  
28 If you have not decided whom to vote for, and if 
there was a woman running in your province, how 
likely are you to vote for her? 
1) Definitely 
2) Very likely 
3) Somewhat likely 
4) A little 
5) Not at all 
6) There is no woman running in my province 
  
73 
 
29 Sex   
 
 
1) Female 
2) Male 
30 Age  
 
 
1) 21-30 
2) 31-40 
3) 41-50 
4) 51-60 
5) 61 and above 
31 Marital status  
 
 
 
1) Single 
2) Married 
3) Divorced 
4) Widowed  
32 Do you have children living with you at home? 1) No 
2) Yes 
33 Current place of residence  
 
 
 
 
 
1) Muscat 
2) Musandam 
3) Adh Dhahirah  
4) Ad Dakhliyah  
5) Al Wusta 
6) Dhofar 
7) Al Buraymi 
8) Al Batinah North 
9) Al Batinah South 
10)  Ash Sharqiyah North 
11)  Ash Sharqiyah South 
34 Permanent place of residence   
 
 
 
 
 
1) Muscat 
2) Musandam 
3) Adh Dhahirah  
4) Ad Dakhliyah  
5) Al Wusta 
6) Dhofar 
7) Al Buraymi 
8) Al Batinah North 
9) Al Batinah South 
10)  Ash Sharqiyah North 
11)  Ash Sharqiyah South 
35 Level of education 
 
 
1) Less than secondary school 
2) Secondary school 
3) Collage degree/AA ( 2 years) 
4) University degree 
5) Graduate degree (Master/PHD) 
(29- 38) Personal information: select one answer for each category  
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36 Current employment status  
 
 
 
1) Employee in public sector 
2) Employee in private sector 
3) Retired 
4) Housewife 
5) Job seeker 
6) Student 
37 Monthly income  
 
 
1) Less than 325 OMR 
2) 325-725 OMR 
3) 726-1126 OMR 
4) 1127 -1526 OMR 
5) Above 1526 OMR 
38 Beside Arabic, which of these languages do you 
speak?  
 
 
 
 
 
1) None 
2) English 
3) Lawati 
4) Swahili 
5) Baluchi 
6) Other, Specify _________ 
 
 
